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SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION 
Electrical wiring systems are used extensively on spacecraft and satellites for power management and 
distribution, control and command, and data transmission. The reliability of the wiring systems when 
exposed to the harsh environments of space is very critical to the success of the mission and the safety of 
the crew. 
Failures in aerospace vehicles have been reported both on the ground and in flight due to arcing-and arc 
propagation in the wiring harnesses. Arc tracking is the propagation of an arc along wiring bundles, and 
is made possible by insulation degradation. Therefore, it is necessary to develop arc track resistant wiring 
insulation in order to minimize, if not eliminate, the risk of failure of critical systems caused by electrical 
shorts and arc propagation. The arc tracking failure mode represents a more severe risk to the aerospace 
vehicle than a simple electrical short, due to the difficulty of fault detection, and the possibility of 
"flashover" of the arc track to adjacent wires, leading to the possible loss of entire wiring harnesses. 
A NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (Code Q) program is currently underway to identify and 
characterize wiring systems in terms of their potential use in aerospace vehicles. Electrical wiring designed 
for power handling, management and distribution will be characterized in this program. Signal-level 
cables and wires, which are intended for data transmission and communication, will be excluded because 
these wire types handle lower power and voltage levels, and therefore are less susceptible to arc tracking. 
The goal of this program is to provide the information and guidance needed to develop and qualify reliable, 
safe, lightweight wiring systems, which are resistant to arc tracking and suitable for use in space power 
applications. New guidelines will be issued once safe operating limits for these systems have been 
established. This program is being performed by the Electrical Components and Systems Branch, Power 
Technology Division, at the NASA Lewis Research Center (LeRC), and is managed by NASA LeRC 
under the top level management of NASA Headquarters, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, 
Technical Standards Division (Code QW). 
Extensive data already exists from testing performed in recent years on the characteristics of wiring 
insulations, including the susceptibility to arc-tracking. Therefore, this program is intended to complete 
the database of testing information on previously analyzed wire types, and consider new insulation 
constructions and materials not previously evaluated. The wire types which are likely to perform best in 
each of the different NASA environments will then be identified. The program is divided into three 
technical tasks: identifying the NASA operational environments (Task #1), performing testing and 
analysis (Task: #2), and analyzing the wiring systems technology (Task #3). 
The purpose of this report is to identify the environments which NASA spacecraft will operate, and to 
determine the specific NASA testing data which needs to be gathered to verify the wiring insulations for 
NASA use. This data will be valuable to spacecraft designers in determining the best wiring constructions 
for the different NASA applications. This report contains the background information related to the 
existence of previous spacecraft wiring failures, and other programs which have addressed the arc tracking 
phenomenon (Section 2). The various types of insulation degradation which can lead to wiring failures are 
discussed (Section 5). Then the operational environments which are encountered by spacecraft during 
different NASA missions are introduced (Section 6), and the testing which needs to be performed to 
address these conditions are outlined (Section 7). Finally, the testing plans and a summary of existing test 
data are given in this report (Section 9: Appendix A). This report will be combined with the reports for 
Task #2 and Task #3, when complete, to form the final program report. 
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SECTION 2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 HISTORY 
In the aerospace arena, wiring system failures have proven to be very costly in terms of loss of very 
expensive equipment, imperilment of missions, and loss of lives. Often, a wiring system failure is not 
simply the result of inadequate insulation, but it is due to a combination of wiring system factors. These 
include mishandling of wiring insulation, system designs which expose wires to abnonnal stresses, and 
exposure to fluids which degrade the insulation. Some of the NASA missions with wiring system. failures 
are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Space Missions with Wiring System Failures [1 - 10] 
Mission Cause Result 
Gemini 8 Electrical Wiring Short Shortened Mission - Near Loss of Crew 
Apollo 204 Damaged Insulation, Electrical Spark, 100% Oz Fire, 3 Astronauts Lost 
Apollo 13 Damaged Insulation/Short Circuit/Flawed Design Oxygen Tank Explosion, Mission Incomplete 
STS - 6 Abrasion of Insulation! Arc Tracking Wire Insulation Pyrolysis, 6 Conductors Melted 
STS - 28 Arc Tracking Teleprinter cable Insulation Pyrolysis 
Magellan Wrong Wiring Connection, Wiring Short Wire Insulation Pyrolysis - Ground Processing 
Spacelab Damaged Insulation/Arc Tracking Wiring Insulation Pyrolysis During Maintenance 
Delta 178/GOES-G Mechanical or Electrochemical Insulation Damage Loss of Vehicle 
STS-48 Insulation Breakdown - Fluid Exposure SRB Fuel Isolation Valve Failure 
ESA - Olympus Electrical Wiring Short Loss of Solar Array 
Since the mid-sixties, polyimide CMll--W-81381) has been the most common material used as wiring 
insulation in aerospace applications due to its high dielectric strength, low weight, non-flammability, good 
thennal properties, and high abrasion resistance. However, it has been reported that MU.--W-81381 may 
undergo some degradation under certain operational environments [4,11-14]. This degradation can lead to 
arc-tracking, which is the propagation of an arc along a wire. The Navy, which has had an extensive 
failure history with polyimide wire and has investigated the use of polyimide wire in Naval aircraft 
thoroughly at its Naval Research Laboratory, has banned the use of polyimide wire (MIL-W -81381) in its 
aircraft [11-13,15]. 
2.2 STATUS 
NASA will engage in manned and unmanned space activities that will demand larger amounts of electrical 
power over longer lifetimes than those of current spacecraft, increasing the likelihood of electrical failure. 
Arc-tracking, which has often not been accounted for in the engineering design, can represent a serious 
and potentially catastrophic event for aerospace vehicles, and testing to assess the susceptibility to arc 
tracking is necessary. However, since arc initiation usually results from damage to the wiring insulation, 
potential for arc tracking can be greatly reduced by implementing specific design features and correct 
installation procedures. These include: (a) wire separation criteria, (b) physical barriers to arc propagation, 
(c) advanced circuit protection devices, (d) wiring protection such as wraps and conduit, and (e) proper 
handling and scheduled maintenance of the wiring systems. System redundancy is also an effective 
method of ensuring that arc tracking in critical system does not result in a catastrophic failure. In the 
absence of an electrical insulation which is perfect for every application, it is necessary to consider the 
overall wiring system when dealing with spacecraft electrical systems. New technologies of fault detection 
may improve the system safety and therefore need to be investigated. 
2-1 
----.- ... -- ----
--~ - -- -- --
Recent programs and testing efforts have analyzed the insulation properties for aerospace applications, 
including the arc-tracking phenomenon, for various insulation types. These programs included those of 
the Air Force Wright Laboratory (WL) and McDonnell Aerospace Company (MDA) which tested "hybrid" 
insulations for the aircraft environment, the Johnson Space Center (JSC) which have characterized 
insulations for the Space Station and Space Shuttle programs, the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) 
which test insulations for various space environments, the Naval Research Laboratory which investigated 
the properties of insulation hydrolysis, and the DuPont Corporation which has examined the properties of 
various DuPont insulations. These programs and testing data focus primarily on experimental testing and 
evaluation for a range of aircraft operational conditions, or a specific NASA application such as Space 
Station Freedom or the Space Shuttle Program. This program will establish a comprehensive test matrix 
and considering the testing performed previously by these groups, will conduct the additional testing 
needed to evaluate the most promising insulation constructions for use in NASA applications. 
2.3 PROGRAM PLAN 
A workshop was held at the NASA Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio in July 1991 to address 
issues and concerns about electrical wiring for aerospace applications. Scientist and engineers 
representing several US federal agencies, national laboratories, academia, and private industry, exchanged 
results and experiences in dealing with a variety of wiring insulation materials. A NASA Office of Safety 
and Mission Quality (Code Q) program was then established to identify and characterize wiring systems in 
terms of their potential use in aerospace vehicles. 
2.3.1 Objective 
The goal of this program is to provide the information and guidance necessary to develop and qualify 
reliable, safe, lightweight wiring systems, using new wiring insulation and constructions which are 
resistant to arc tracking and suitable for use in space power applications. 
2.3.2 Approach 
The approach combines NASA LeRC in-house, other NASA centers, Department of Defense (DOD) 
laboratories, and contracted efforts to achieve the objective. The program is divided into the following 
tasks: 
Task #1 - NASA Operational Environments: The objective of this task is to identify operational 
environments as relevant to electrical power wiring for a variety of NASA space missions 
and vehicles, to evaluate the applicability of the findings of previous aerospace wiring test 
programs to NASA missions, and to identify the additional testing necessary to identify the 
best candidate insulation constructions for NASA applications. 
Task #2 - Wiring Construction Testing and Analysis: The objective of this task is to evaluate potential 
insulation systems and to determine their suitability for use in NASA aerospace 
environments. 
Task #3 - Wiring Systems Technology: The objective of this task is to address safety and reliability 
issues of complete wiring systems. This task will identify related technologies which have 
an impact on prevention, detection, and isolation of wiring failure and system 
reconfiguration following failure. 
Task #4 - Management Planning: The objective of this task is to plan, manage, and report on the 
progress of this program. 
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SECTION 3. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW 
The purpose of the NASA wiring program is to identify and characterize wiring systems which enhance 
the safety and reliability of aerospace vehicles. 1bis information will provide the basis of new guidelines 
for the wiring of NASA power systems. To facilitate the acceptance of these guidelines throughout the 
aerospace community, the input of the various NASA centers and DOD laboratories, industry, and 
academia has been solicited in the initial phases of the program, and a high level of involvement will 
continue throughout the duration of the program 
The military has developed an extensive database of testing information for aircraft wiring systems, 
identifying potential materials and wiring constructions and their arc tracking behavior. However, the 
NASA environments, and therefore the insulation requirements, may be significantly different than for 
aircraft. These include wiring systems which must operate in Earth-orbiting satellites, inside pressurized 
modules, on the lunar and martian surfaces, and in trans-atmospheric applications, such as the Space 
Shuttle and other launch vehicles. The NASA program extends beyond the existing testing database for 
wiring to completely address the effects of the NASA unique mission environments. The operational 
environments for space missions, and the existing testing databases for wiring systems, are presented for 
use by spacecraft design engineers. 
3 - 1 
SECTION 4. SCOPE 
The scope of this program, and therefore this report, is limited to the electrical wiring of "conventional" 
power systems. The electrical operating conditions of such systems are discussed in Section 6. Wiring 
for applications other than power handling, such as for data transmission and communication, while not 
required to meet the electrical requirements of power wiring, are sti.ll expected to be subject to the space 
environments defined in this report. Wiring systems with extreme electrical requirements, such as lunar 
surface transmission of power at very high voltages (kV's), are not considered to be within the scope of 
this program. Additionally, other potential space operational conditions, such as the high temperature and 
radiation environment in the close vicinity of a space nuclear reactor, are not included in this program. 
In this report, the operational environments for aircraft and space missions are presented and discussed. 
The classifications of NASA missions which are considered in this report are as discussed below: 
a . Pressurized Module Environments: These include the manned environment of the space 
shuttle, and the Space Station Freedom habitation and laboratory modules, which are 
characterized by an enriched oxygen environment. The operational effects of launch/decent of 
the pressurized modules are also included in this environment. 
b. Low Earth Orbit/Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (LEO/GEO) Environments: These include the 
LEO orbiting Space Station Freedom, and the many satellites (i.e. communications, remote 
sensing) which are positioned throughout the LEO and GEO orbits. Again, the launch 
operational effects are included in this case. 
c. Trans-atmospheric Vehicle Environments: These include the operational environments of the 
space shuttle (manned) and the expendable launch vehicles (unmanned) as they travel from the 
Earth's surface to space. The operational temperature ranges (hot and cold) of the NASA 
applications which are considered in this program will be given in Section 6. Extreme 
temperatures outside of these ranges, such as engine heat during launch, friction upon vehicle 
re-entry, or deep space, may require specialized insulations, and are beyond the scope of this 
program. 
d. Lunar and Martian Environments: Included will be permanent outposts on the lunar and 
martian surfaces. Like the other cases, the operational effects of launch/descent will be 
included in this environment 
The testing which was performed to verify the insulations for the aircraft environment are in many cases 
sufficient for NASA missions as well. There are, however, environments which are unique to NASA 
spacecraft. The testing required for wiring which will operate in each of the NASA application 
environments, as compared to the testing already performed, will be outlined in Section 7. 
SECTION 5. DEGRADATION AND FAILURE OF ELECTRICAL WIRING 
INSULATION 
This section discusses the various forms of wiring insulation degradation and failure modes which can 
occur when the wiring is in operation on spacecraft. In Section 6, the environmental conditions which will 
be encountered by NASA spacecraft will be introduced, and in Section 7, the testing which is needed to 
evaluate wiring constructions for use on NASA spacecraft, when the environments, spacecraft design, and 
mission operations are considered, will be determined. -
5.1 Insulation DeKradation Types 
5. 1.1 Abrasion. Vibration and tight confmement can result in abrasion, causing wire damage during 
flight and while servicing. The vibration during launch can result in abrasion damage to both the 
launch vehicle and its spacecraft cargo [4,16]. While maintenance procedures can result in high 
levels of insulation degradation as has been experienced on the Space Shuttle [9]. 
5.1.2 Atomic aXYKen (Aa) Effects. Exposure to AO erodes certain insulation materials to the 
point of causing a loss of mass, which results in a reduced insulation thickness and a change in 
the functional properties [17]. Additionally, the synergistic effects of AO and UV radiation 
exposure can be more extreme than either effect when considered separately [14]. 
5.1.3 CbarKed Plasma Effects. In the GEO environment, a low-density, high energy charged 
plasma can lead to differential charging of different spacecraft parts. At times of solar substorm 
activity, the plasma interactions can be elevated to levels exceeding the breakdown voltages, 
leading to and arc between spacecraft surfaces [18-20]. The Low Earth Orbits have a high-
density, low energy plasma. This type of plasma does not ordinarily lead to differential 
charging, but to charging of the spacecraft surfaces with respect to the surrounding plasma. Arcs 
in LEO occur from conductor-insulator junctions (including holes in wiring insulation) when the 
conductor is highly negative when compared to the surrounding plasma [20]. It has also been 
shown that the combined effect of debris impacts and the charged plasma environment can result ' 
in the vaporization and ionization of material during the impact, and the initiation of an arc [21]. 
For wiring, the plasma environment would only be a factor for externally exposed wires 
5.1.4 Electrical Breakdown. The electrical breakdown of the insulations can result from corona, 
which is the discharge of an electrical arc from the wire conductor to a point of lower potential, 
either another conductor or simply the surrounding space. According to the Paschen 
relationship, with increasing voltage the possibility of corona rises, with the inverse relationship 
holding for pressure [16] . 
5.1.5 Electromawetic Radiation. Electromagnetic radiation includes ultraviolet (UV) light, x-
rays, and gamma rays. Oxidation is the most severe damage due to UV radiation, but this will 
only occur where oxygen is present, such as on the Earth's surface. However, UV radiation is 
generally minor. Nonetheless, the UV radiation can cause insulation embrittlement as a result of 
chain scission or cross-linking, reduce insulation mass, and also cause color changes [16,22]. 
Additionally, the synergistic effect of UV and AO exposure can cause even more severe mass 
loss [14]. 
5.1.6 Hydrolysis. Hydrolysis is a degradation of the insulation material due to exposure to certain 
fluids or moisture; it results in loss of strength, causes embrittlement, and makes the insulation 
material susceptible to cracking. The hydrolytic reaction reduces the polymer chain length and 
renders it weak and brittle, with a tendency to crack radially at sharp bends [4,17]. The exposure 
of insulation to strong alkalis (high pH solutions) accelerates the rate of degradation from 
negligibly small to unacceptable [17,23]. 
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5.1. 7 Insulation Cut Throu~h. Cuts or notches in the insulation can be caused by a number of 
mechanical stresses including vibration, maintenance procedures, and meteoroids and debris. 
These can damage the insulation integrity, rendering the wires susceptible to arc initiation. 
Meteoroids and debris impacting the surface of the wiring can create holes in the insulation, even 
particles less than 1 mm in diameter may be damaging because of the frequency and velocity of 
impact, while large pieces of debris could completely sever a wire [16]. 
5.1. 8 Qut~assin~(Thermal vacuum StabjJjtyl. Outgassing occurs at low pressures .or in a 
vacuum, where molecules with relatively low weight fractions, umeacted additives, 
contaminants, adsorbed (on surfaces) and absorbed (in bulk) gases, or moisture evaporate. The 
loss of these additives and contaminants can change important properties of the insulation. For 
example, the loss of a plasticizer by evaporation in a vacuum environment will produce a more 
rigid or brittle material, with a corresponding decrease in elongation and increase in tensile and 
flexure strength. Chemical changes may occur when water and gases gradually diffuse out of the 
material, which can lead to the degradation of the wiring insulation [16]. 
5.1.9 Particulate Radiation. The particulate radiation environment is composed of cosmic rays, 
VanAllen belt radiation, aurora particles, and solar flare particles. It consists of electrons, 
protons, neutrons, alpha particles, and others. The damage is dependent upon the energy and 
type of particles. Radiation damage such as removal of a bonded electron leading to bond 
rupture, free radicals and discoloration can occur. The result can include the loss of mechanical 
strength, an increase in vapor pressure and viscosity, and a reduction in molecular weight [16]. 
5 .1. 10 Temperature Effects. Under normal gravity and atmospheric conditions, gasses can provide 
cooling to an overheated or burning wire due to convection processes. However, in space, hot 
gasses can remain stagnant in the area of the heat source. Because of the absence of most heat 
transport systems, space wiring systems may be subjected to extreme high and low temperatures. 
Short of direct thermal damage, the effects of aging may be accelerated under temperature 
extremes. Elevated temperatures can cause damage such as softening, melting, and chemical 
decomposition, while extremely cold temperatures can cause some insulations to become brittle 
[16,24]. 
When exposed to thermal cycling, the cable conductors and insulations, which have different 
coefficients of thermal expansion, will experience mechanical stress each thermal cycle. 
Repeated tensile and compressive forces will react against the connector pins, assuming that the 
connectors are restrained. Although small, the movement is cyclic and continuous for the life of 
the cable insulation. Some polymers have a "memory" in that they tend to crease, stretch, or fold 
in the same place once this action has occurred. Repeated creasing or stretching in the same place 
will eventually lead to insulation failure [25]. 
5.2 Insulation Failure Modes 
5 . 2 . 1 Arc-Trackin~. Arc tracking in electrical wire insulation has recently been identified as a failure 
mode that can cause extensive damage to aircraft wire harnesses and possible secondary ignition 
of other materials. Arc tracking occurs when an insulated wire sustains a propagating arc at a 
certain current or voltage. An electrical arc can be produced due to a short circuit, overload 
current, or localized stressing of the wiring systems. Wiring insulations can become susceptible 
to electrical arc propagation when mechanical, chemical, or thermal damage has occurred (dry arc 
tracking), or when a conductive fluid is present (wet arc tracking). Once initiated, the arc can 
propagate along the wire or to adjacent wires (flashover) causing a circuit malfunction. The rate 
and extent of arc tracking depends on the type of insulation material and construction, applied 
power and frequency, wire gauge, and environmental factors, such as temperature, pressure, and 
humidity. When relating voltage level to arc-tracking, tests have shown that in general the 
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probability of arc-tracking becomes greater as the voltage level rises, with the exception of a 
possible dip at intermediate voltages (120 to 160 Volts) [16,26]. 
In some cases, the conductive path of the carbon arc track displays a high enough resistance such 
that the current is limited, and therefore may be difficult to detect using conventional circuit 
protection. Tests at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) have shown that for the space 
shuttle power system, arc-tracking was limited to lengths of less than 1" up to 6" [17,25-28]. 
New fault detection technology may improve the detection of these faults. 
5.2.2 Combustion. The combustion of materials which can result from an electrical arc is infiuenced 
by the percent oxygen and pressure level in the area where the wire is operating. MIL-W -81381 
was chosen because of its favorable properties, including being non-flammable. To be 
considered for NASA applications, all of the insulation materials must also be non-flammable 
[17,23]. An enriched oxygen concentration can increase flame-spread rate, and increase 
extinguishment difficulty [24]. 
5.2.3 Electrical Short. An electrical short is the most common form of failure occurrence in 
electrical wiring. Arc tracking (see above) is a secondary type of failure which can occur as a 
result of a short circuit fault. Most short circuits result in extremely high currents, and are 
interrupted by the protection systems. However, even momentary short circuits can result in 
permanent insulation damage or the initiation of combustion. The extent of damage which occurs 
as a result of a short circuit fault is dependent upon the circuit protection, wiring insulation, and 
operational environment. 
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SECTION 6. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS OF WIRING SYSTEMS 
The specific electrical, mechanical, and environmental conditions for the NASA missions and military 
aircraft are given in Table 2, and discussion and references are provided in this section. The NASA 
mission environments can then be compared to the aircraft environment (Section 7), for which testing has 
already been performed in the WL testing program (Section 9). This comparison, combined with the 
database of testing results which currently exists from other DOD and NASA programs (Section 9), will 
yield the additional testing which needs to be performed in this program. The specific operational 
conditions to be addressed, as defined in Section 4, consist of the NASA pressurized modules, low Earth 
orbit (LEO) spacecraft, geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) spacecraft, trans-atmospheric vehicles, lunar 
surface and Mars surface missions. 
6.1 NASA Pressurized Module Operational Enyironments 
6. 1. 1 Electrical. The space shuttle has a 28 VDC power system, supplied by 3 primary fuel cells 
which can supply a total of 7 kW of steady state power to the payload and habitat region of the 
vehicle [29-32]. The original Space Station Freedom design had a total power requirement of 75 
kW from four 18.75 kW solar modules. Presently the design requirement has been scaled back 
to 56.25 kW due to the elimination of the fourth solar power module [33]. The distribution 
voltage inside the Space Station Freedom pressurized modules, between the internal DC to DC 
converter units and the loads is 120 VDC. At the loads the distribution voltage is 28 VDC [34]. 
6.1.2 Temperature. The interior temperature of the pressurized modules is to be regulated for 
habitation by astronauts, these temperatures can range between 18.3°C and 26.TC [35]. 
Because of the regulated temperature, thermal cycling is not a significant factor. 
6.1.3 Atmospheric. In the NASA pressurized environments, the atmosphere will be nominally air 
(21 % oxygen, 101 kPa total pressure) enriched to 30% oxygen at 69 kPa total pressure for 
prebreathing prior to an extravehicular activity [35,36]. 
6.1.4 vibration. The only significant vibration which the pressurized environments will experience 
are during launch, since very little vibration will occur while in orbit The launch vibration 
environment, depending upon the launch configuration, can approach values of acceleration as 
high as 109 and frequencies approaching 1000 Hz [37]. 
For both the Space Shuttle and expendable launch vehicles, vibration induced from acoustic 
fields may be an important factor. Mter ignition, the intensity of the acoustical fields from the 
rocket engine exhaust increase until lift-off. As the launcher rises, the strength of the field 
reflected from the ground decreases. The acoustic field experiences a second increase as the 
vehicle approaches the speed of sound due to aerodynamic disturbances. A vibrational response 
results, which can be many times larger than the structurally transmitted vibration. For typical 
launch vehicles, the acoustic noise environment has a sound pressure level of 137 to 145 dB as 
shown in Figure 1 [16,37]. 
6.1.5 MeteoroidlDebris. Obviously, if space debris or a meteorite penetrates a pressurized module, 
the damage caused to wiring insulation will be a trivial part of the overall hazard. 
6.1.6 Gas/Fluid. For NASA pressurized modules, the relative humidity (RH) is not to exceed 70% 
or fall below 25% [35]. Most NASA spacecraft will experience a worst case humidity 
environment when being assembled, stored, and transported before launch, as the environment is 
not always regulated, and can rise to the earth's humidity level of up to 100% [23]. While the 
launch vehicles are on the launch pad, the payload environment is regulated to 50% RH or less 
[3,15,29,38]. 
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Table 2. Operational Environments 
Pressurized Geosynchronous Trans--Low Earth atmospheric 
Modules Orbit Earth Orbit Vehicle 
Electrical 
Voltage 28~120V 28 ~ 160V 28 ~270V 
Frequency DC 
Mechanical 
Vibration 1 ~ 109 137 ~ 145 dB SPL 
Particle N/A 11 ~ 26 impacts/m2/yr <LEO LEO~GEO Impacts (Altitude Dependent) (Altitude Dependent) 
Environmental 
Temperature 18.3'C ~ 26.7°C -65'C -t 120' C -196'C ~ 128°C -200'C ~ 260°C 6000 cycleslyr 90 cycleslyr Cycles Altitude Dependent 
Atmosphere Earth -+ 30% O2 Earth ~ Very Low ~ 
GruVFluid 25-475%RH 100% RH Salt Fog 100% RH Salt Ibg Compa tibility Space Fluids Space Fluids 
Pressure 517 ~ 760Torr 10'S ~ 10-10 Torr 7.5 x 10-14 Torr 760 ~ 7.5xI0·14 Torr 
Electromagnetic N/A 2220 ~ 5800 ESH/yr 8760 ESH/yr 8760 ESHlyr Radiation (Altitude Dependent) (Altitude Dependent) 
Particulate N/A Protons, ct Particles, and Electrons Radiation 
Atomic N/A 1020 - 1()22 atoms/em21y N/A LEO~GEO Oxygen (Altitude Dependent) (Altitude Dependent) 
Reduced 10-3 -+ 1~ g 10.3 -+ 1()-6 g I ~ 10-6 g 
Gravity 
Charged N/A 0.3 ~ 5x104 atoms/cm
3 0.24 ~ 1.12 atoms/em3 LEO~GID 
Plasma 0.1-+ 0.2eV 120 ~ 295 keY 
Lunar Martian Military 
Surface Surface Aircraft 
! 
28 ~ 160V 28V 
DC~20kHz DC~400 Hz 
25 ~m amplitude 
500Hz 
0.01 ~0.5 Very Low Probability N/A impacts/m2lyr 
-171°C ~ IH'C -143°C ~27°C 
13 cyc1eslyr 356 cycles/yr -65°C ~ 230'C 
Earth -+ 0.13% O2, Earth Atmosphere 95.3% CO2 
25 -475% RH 
Aerospace Fluids 
IQ-B -+ 10-12Torr 4.4 ~ 11.4 Torr 49 -+ 760 Torr 
8760 ESH/yr 1656 ESH/yr Earth UV 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A 
0.165 g 0.38 g N/A 
N/A 103 ~ 105 atoms/em3 N/A 
Figure 1. Acoustic Environment of Payloads for Launch Systems [37] 
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All wiring for space applications should be compatible with typical space fluids such as 
hydrazine, hydraulic fluid, monomethylhydrazine, nitrogen tetroxide, and ammonia as well as 
others that may result in serious degradation of the wiring insulation. 
6.1. 7 Pressure. The pressurized modules are regulated at constant pressures of 69 to 101 kPa (10 -
14.7 psi, 517 - 760 Torr) [36]. 
6.1.8 Electromaa:netic Radiation. The pressurized modules will shield the wiring from exposure 
to the ultraviolet radiation of the space environment 
6.1. 9 Partjculate Radiation. The pressurized modules, as a basic requirement, must be radiation 
resistant enough to enable human habitation. The resistance of electrical insulations to particulate 
radiation will be better than that of humans or electronics [39]. 
6.1.10 Atomic Oxy"n. Not Applicable. 
6.1.11 Grayity. In LEO, the residual gravity is not zero, but ranges from < 1Q-6g to 1O-3g. While the 
fundamental aerodynamic minimum level is 1Q-6g, the 104g to 1O-3g range will result due to 
venting forces, station keeping thrusters, crew motion, and the gravity gradient [30]. The 
payloads can also experience accelerations of up to 8g during launch [37]. 
6.1.12 Cbara:ed Plasma. All of the wires for the Space Station Freedom pressurized modules are 
assumed to be inside of the pressurized environment, and therefore unexposed to the plasma. 
6.2 NASA LEO/GEO Operational Enyironments 
6.2 . 1 Electrical. In general, the vast majority of satellites built to date for both LEO and OED have 
power distribution at a potential of 28 VDe [34]. The power levels of present LEO and OED 
spacecraft range in power capability from a few Watts to a few kW. The highest flown to date 
was Skylab, which had an average power level of 8 kW [40,41]. 
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6.2.2 Temperature. The temperature environment in LEO is extreme due to the contrast between Sun 
exposure and Earth shadowing. This can range from -65"C to 120·C [25,36]. The frequency 
which a satellite will experience an eclipse increases as the satellites altitude decreases, this is 
shown in Figure 2. Typically, for a 550 Ian orbit, there will be about 15 eclipses per day, 
resulting in 5500 thermal cycles per year [37]. 
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Figure 2. Eartb Orbiting Satellite Eclipses [16] 
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In GEO, the eclipse seasons are as shown in Figure 3. There are seasons of about 45 days, 
twice per year, with a maximum shadow time of 1.2 hours per day. As a result, there will be 90 
thermal cycles per year. The approximate temperature range of these cycles is expected to be 
from -196°C to 128·C [37,42]. 
Figure 3. Eclipse Seasons in Geosynchronous Orbit [37] 
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6.2.3 Atmospheric. The lack of significant oxygen or pressure makes a fire on orbit an impossibility 
unless it occurs in the presence of oxygen such as inside a fuel cell oxygen tank [8]. 
6.2.4 Vibration. See discussion for Pressurized Modules Section 6.1.4. 
6.2 . 5 Particle Impacts. The LEO environment is more severe than the GEO environment, and can 
result in an impact flux of 11 to 26 impacts/m2/year for particles of significant size [43]. Smaller 
particles can be significant if there is a charged plasma environment because an arc can result, or 
if the surface has important optical properties [21]. 
6.2.6 Gas/Fluid. See discussion for Pressurized Modules Section 6.1.6. 
6.2.7 Pressure. The LEO environment will have pressures ranging from 10-8 to 10-3 Pa (10-10 to 10-5 
Torr) [19,44]. The GEO environment will have pressures which approach the interplanetary 
value of 10-11 Pa (7.5 X 10-14 Torr) [45]. 
6.2.8 Electromaenetic Radiation. The total energy received from the Sun per unit area at 1 
Astronomical Unit (AU) is the solar constant, and it equals 1353 W/m2 at air mass zero (AMO). 
The region of the solar spectrum which contains 99.5 percent of the total energy is the region 
from 0.12 Jlm to 10 Jlm, or the UV, visible, and IR bands as shown in Figure 4. The energy of 
the radiation is inversely proportional to the wavelength, therefore the ultraviolet light is higher in 
energy than the visible or infrared. The energy of the UV radiation can be high enough to cause 
excitation, if not ionization, in some materials. Over the whole UV wavelength range, up to 400 
nm, the intensity average is 118 W/m2 [16]. 
Figure 4. Spectral Distribution of Sunligb,t [16] 
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Other types of Electromagnetic radiation include x-rays and gamma rays having wavelengths of 
approximately 10-8 cm. Although these types of radiation are high in energy, they are not found 
in high enough levels to be a significant part of the natural radiation environment [16]. 
6 .2.9 Particulate Radiation. Particulate solar radiation consists primarily of the protons and 
electrons of the solar wind. These are trapped by the Earth's magnetic field forming the 
Plasmasphere or the Van Allen radiation belts. The formation of the Earth radiation environment 
is shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Earth Particulate Radiation Environment [16] 
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The plasmasphere is divided into two zones, an area of mostly low energy electrons (20 ke V to 1 
MeV) and high energy protons (~600 Me V) extending from about 480 km to 6400 km above the 
Earth, and an area consisting of very high energy electrons (20 -ke V to 5 Me V) with a small 
number of low energy protons (-60 MeV) which extends from 16,000 to 58,000 km [16,22]. 
Solar flare particles, although sporadic, are considered a great radiation hazard, as they result in 
proton and Alpha particle (He+) emissions of up to 100's of MeV's. Galactic radiation consists 
of 85% protons, 14% Alpha particles, and 1% heavier atoms, and have very high energy 
(>1000's MeV); however, the intensity of exposure is low (2.5 particles/cm2s) [16,22] . 
The Auroral radiation zone is located between approximately 60 0 and 65 0 geomagnetic latitude 
and consists mostly of low energy « 200 ke V) electrons and some protons. These particles do 
not represent a serious radiation problem [16]. 
The majority of radiation at synchronous orbit are solar flare protons, as opposed to particles 
trapped by the Earth's magnetic field [16]. 
6 . 2.10 Atomic Oxye,en. The wires may be exposed to an extreme atomic oxygen environment. On 
average for low Earth orbits (400 - 500 km), the atomic oxygen exposure can range from 1011 -
1012 atoms/m3 with an average atomic energy of 4.3 to 4.4 eV [43,46]. However, the level of 
exposure is dependent on the solar activity as shown in Figure 6. This leads to an equivalent 
fluence for testing of wiring insulation of lOW - 1022 atoms/cm2/year [14,46]. 
6 .2.11 Grayity. See discussion for Pressurized Modules Section 6.1.11. 
6 .2. 12 Chare,ed Plasma. The plasma environment for LEO has an ion density (positive or negative) 
of 3 x 104 to 9 X 105 cm·3 depending upon the degree of solar activity and orbit position. The 
thermal energies of the electrons and positive ions are in the range of 0.1 to 0.2 e V, 
corresponding to temperatures of 1200 K to 2400 K. In general, the plasma in LEO is a high 
density, low energy environment and can lead to arcing from exposed surfaces to the ambient 
plasma [18-20,36]. 
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The GEO plasma environment is a low density, high energy plasma, and can result in significant 
charging which can lead to arcing between spacecraft surfaces. The worst case geosynchronous 
plasma environment, which should be used in predicting spacecraft potentials, are given by ion 
and electron densities from 0.24 to 1.12 cm-3 and thermal energies of 120 to 295 keY [18-20]. 
Figure 6. Atomic Oxygen Density Levels [47] 
1000 
800 /' Maximum Solar Activity 
600 
400 
200 Minimum Solar ACtiVit/ 
o 
1010 1012 1014 1016 
Number Density, m-3 
6.3 NASA Trans-atmospheric vehicle Operational Enyironments 
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6.3 . 1 Electrical. The space shuttle has a 28 VDC power system, supplied by 3 primary fuel cells, 
while the power distribution systems for the expendable launch vehicles are from 28 to 270 
VDC. The space shuttle's primary fuel cells can supply a total of 7 kW of steady state power to 
the payload and habitat region of the vehicle [29-32]. 
6.3.2 Temperature. For the space shuttle, the temperature range is -156·C to 200·C, while for 
expendable launch vehicles the range is -200·C to 260·C [3,29]. 
The launch vehicle will endure thermal cycling dependent upon its altitude and duration in orbit 
The space shuttle in LEO will endure frequent thermal cycling with great extremes (-65·C to 
120·C); however, it is only in orbit for a few days at a time. An expendable launch vehicle is 
only operational in orbit for a few minutes/hours, so thermal cycling is not a concern. 
6.3.3 Atmospheric. See the discussion for the LEO/GEO environment (6.2.3), except for the 
pressurized regions of the space shuttle, which are included in the Pressurized Module 
discussion (6.1.3). 
6.3.4 vibration. See the discussion for Pressurized Modules Section 6.1.4. 
6.3.5 Particle Impacts. See the discussion for LEO/GEO Section 6.2.5. 
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6.3.6 Gas/Fluid. See discussion for Pressurized Modules Section 6.1.6. For the Space Shuttle, the 
only areas with a controlled humidity environment are the payload bay and crew cabin. The 
humidity is not controlled during the roll out from the KSC Vehicle Assembly Building to the 
launch pad [23]. 
6.3.7 Pressure. The trans-atmospheric vehicle pressures will range from 101 kPa (760 Torr) at Sea 
Level to 10-11 Pa (7.5 x 10-14 Torr) for interplanetary altitudes. Above 2500 lan, the gas pressure 
decreases exponentially with increasing altitude, and reaches the interplanetary value near 20,000 
km. For the space shuttle, the pressure in the cargo bay is affected by the movement of the 
shuttle. The pressure is nominally 104 Pa (10-6 Torr) after the thrusters are fired for 1 second, 
and reaching 4x 1(}4 Pa (3x 1(}4 Torr) after 1 minute of firing[19,45]. 
6.3.8 Electromaepetjc Radiation. See discussion for LEO/GEO Section 6.2.8. 
6.3.9 Particulate Radiation. See discussion for LEO/GEO Section 6.2.9. 
6.3.10 Atomic OxYeen. See discussion for LEO/GEO Section 6.2.10. 
6.3.11 Grayity. See discussion for Pressurized Modules Section 6.1.11. 
6.3.12 Chareed Plasma. The plasma environment of a launch vehicle is expected to range from a 
non-plasma environment on earth, to that of the LEO and GEO environments. For a vehicle 
traveling beyond a GEO orbit, the plasma environment in free space is approximated by that at 
GEO [18,19]. 
6.4 NASA Lunar and Martian Surface Operatiopal Enyironments 
6.4.1 Electrical. When Lunar and Martian systems are developed, the baseline system will likely be 
based on technology developed for Space Station and Space Shuttle programs. Electrical 
distribution levels considered will range from 28 VDC to 160 VDC. High frequency AC power 
distribution may also be considered, because of the expanding power requirements and utility 
type system requirements [48]. Total power system requirements for permanently manned 
outposts have been proposed ranging up to 150 kW for Mars and 725 kW for the Moon. 
However, recent estimates for the Moon and Mars power requirements are 50 kW and 20 kW 
respectively. Additionally, systems with even lower power levels have been proposed as a way 
to reduce the mission costs [33,48-51]. 
6 • 4 • 2 Temperature. The surface temperature of the Moon, due to the lack of an atmosphere, varies 
greatly during the day and night cycles. During the 364 hour lunar day, the temperature can rise 
to 111·C, while during the equally long lunar night, the temperature can drop to -171·C. The 
lunar day/night cycle of 28 days results in 13 cycles in 1 Earth year [45]. 
The existence of the thin Martian atmosphere, and the decreased solar intensity (590 W/m2) due 
to the increased distance from the sun (1.5 AU), result in a smaller temperature range than on the 
lunar surface. During the daytime, the temperature is a moderate 2TC, while at night, the 
temperature can drop to -143·C. Similar to the lunar surface case, the Mars thermal cycles are 
dependent upon the day/night cycles (12.3 hr day/12.3 hr night). Therefore, 356 cycles per 
Earth year will occur [45,52]. 
6.4.3 Atmospheric. See discussion for LEO/GEO Section 6.2.3. 
6.4.4 Vibration. See discussion for Pressurized Modules Section 6.1.4. 
6.4 . 5 Particle Impacts. The Moon is bombarded with meteoroids and micro meteoroids. These 
micro meteoroids are the result of cometary debris, interstellar grains, and lunar ejecta. With no 
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protection from an atmosphere, impact velocities range from 24 to 72 krn/s. The actual hazard is 
small for meteoroids with pit sizes approximately equal to SOO ~m in diameter, which have an 
impact rate between 0.01 to O.S impacts/m2/yr. Additionally, meteoroids of approximately 100 
grams will have an impact rate of 1.2 x 104 impacts/knWyr, with larger meteoroids impacting at 
even lower rates [4S]. 
On Mars, due to the atmosphere, the probability of meteoroid impact is very low [S2]. 
6.4.6 Gas/Fluid. See discussion for Pressurized Modules Section 6.1.6. Additionally, on Mars the 
average amount of atmospheric water vapor is 0.03% by volume. The water vapor concentration 
is closely linked to the temperature distribution; during most of the year and at most latitudes the 
atmosphere holds all of the water possible (100% relative humidity) [4S]. 
Build up of dust particles on lunar surface wiring is likely to occur due to surface activities. 
Direct degradation of the insulation in contact with the lunar soil may not be an issue, but the 
secondary effects of dust accumulation must be considered. Studies have estimated that a layer 
of dust more than about 11 ~m would not only effectively block thermal radiation, but it would 
also limit all heat transfer to the insulation, due to the poor conductivity of the lunar soil [53]. 
6.4.7 Pressure. Due to the fact that there is no continuous "lower atmosphere", the "upper 
atmosphere" extends to the surface of the Moon and it is nearly a collisionless gas. The density 
is approximately 2 x lOS molecules/cm3 at night corresponding to a pressure of 10-10 Pa (10-12 
Torr) [45,54]. 
The surface atmospheric pressure on Mars varies with the seasons, ranging from 600 to 1500 Pa 
(4.4 to 11.3 Torr) [45]. 
6 . 4 • 8 Electrornametic Radiation. When the lunar surface is exposed to the Sun, the solar flux is 
1371 W/m2, due to the lack of significant atmosphere. The ultraviolet radiation exposure on the 
lunar surface will be equal to 1 UV sun [4S]. 
The solar radiation on the surface of Mars ranges from 590 W/m2, without forward scattering by 
small particles in the Mars atmosphere, to 649 W/m2, if the scattering is taken into account 
[43,45]. 
6.4.9 Particulate Radiation. The particulate radiation exposures on the lunar surface are shown in 
Table 3. The solar wind consists mostly of H and He nuclei, and is the dominant source of the 
lunar particulate radiation. Surface features exposed to the solar wind, with a velocity of 
approximately 400 km/s, are gradually smoothed by a process known as sputtering. However, 
this process poses little hazard to equipment on the surface, for example the erosion lifetime of a 
rock with a diameter of only 10-6 m is estimated to be 105 years [45]. Solar cosmic rays are 
ejected from the sun during solar flares, and are dominated by the nuclei of light atoms (H, He) 
while heavier nuclei (Ca, Fe) also occur. These high energy particles can penetrate the lunar 
surface materials to a depth of 1 em [45]. Galactic cosmic rays are charged particles from outside 
the solar system, and are the most energetic particles to reach the lunar surface. They have lunar 
penetration depths that exceed 1 m, but the flux rate is significantly lower than that of solar 
cosmic rays [4S]. 
Table 3. Lunar Particulate Radiation [45] 
Source Me V /nucleon Proton Flux Penetration 
(cm-2sec-1) Depth (cm) 
Solar Wind 10-3 108 10-6 
Solar Cosmic Rays 1 to lOZ 102 10-3 to 1 
Galactic Cosmic Rays 102 to 1()4 1 1 to 103 
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On Mars, the atmosphere below 120 km is dominated by CO2. Just below 130 lan, the ion 
concentrations of 02+ and C~+ are at their peak of 105 cm-3 and a temperature of 150 K. At 
altitudes of 225 km, 0+ ions are at a peak of 103 cm-3, with a temperature of 210 K. Above this 
altitude, departure from thermal equilibriwn with the neutral gas occur, and the ion temperature 
increases rapidly to over 1000 K [45]. 
6.4.10 Atomic OXY2en. Not Applicable. 
6.4.11 Grayity. The gravity on the surface of the Moon, because it is less massive than the Earth, is 
0.165 g or 162.3 cm/s2. On Mars the gravity is 0.38 g or 372.52 crn/s2 [45] . 
6.4 .12 Char2ed Plasma. At the Moon, the solar wind plasma consists mostly of charged H and He 
nuclei. Additionally, solar cosmic rays ejected from the sun during solar flares, and Galactic 
cosmic rays, from the outside the solar system are present These charged particles may cause 
potentials to develop between the spacecraft and ground, resulting in electrostatic discharges 
[45] . 
The interaction of Mars with the solar wind is a cross between a magnetospheric interaction and 
an atmospheric interaction [45]. 
6.5 Aircraft Operational Enyironments 
6 . 5.1 Electrical. The electrical power systems for military aircraft are primarily 28V with frequencies 
from DC to 400 Hz [53]. 
6.5 . 2 Temperature. The properties of aircraft wiring have been analyzed in testing with temperatures 
in the range of -65°C to 230°C [53]. 
6 . 5.3 Atmospheric. Military aircraft operate in the earth's atmosphere, where dry air has an oxygen 
content of 20.95 % by volume on average [55]. 
6.5.4 Vibration . Acoustical vibration can result in aircraft because of jet wake and combustion 
turbulence. This vibration can range up to 500 Hz and a maximum amplitude of approximately 
25 /lIIl [16] . 
6.5.5 Particle Impacts. Not Applicable. 
6.5.6 Gas/Fluid. A wide range of aerospace fluids need to be considered, including lubricating oil, 
hydraulic fluid, dielectric coolant fluid, isopropyl alcohol, gasoline, and others [53] . 
6. 5. 7 Pressure. The aircraft pressures range from the sea level atmospheric pressure of 101 kPa (760 
Torr) to 6.5 kPa (49 Torr), which simulates an environment of 18,000 m (60,000 feet) [53]. 
6.5.8 Electromawetic Radiation. See discussion for Trans-atmospheric Vehicle Section 6.3.8. 
6.5.9 Particulate Radiation. Not Applicable. 
6.5.10 Atomic OXY2en. Not Applicable. 
6.5 .1 1 Grayity. Not Applicable. 
6.5.12 Char~edPlasma. Not Applicable. 
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SECTION 7. NASA TESTING REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SPACECRAFT WIRING 
The operational environments, combined with specific operational and design factors for the various 
spacecraft, which can lead to additional degradation or provide built-in protection from the space 
environments, determine the NASA testing requirements. Then by considering the testing which already 
has been performed by NASA, the DOD and other agencies, the additional testing necessary to address the 
NASA operational environments are given in this section. 
7.1 NASA Spacecraft Design/Operational Factors 
Along with the operational environments presented in Section 6, spacecraft are designed to reduce or 
eliminate the exposure to certain environmental conditions. In most cases, this is because, depending on 
mission length, none of the insulations used to date could survive full exposure to the space environment 
without protection of some kind. Additionally, the mission of some NASA spacecraft lead to degradation 
due to operations which are not addressed by strictly considering the environments, an example of this is 
the space shuttle maintenance requirements. In this section, the spacecraft design and operational factors 
which reduce the influence of space environments or give rise to additional degradation possibilities are 
discussed. 
7 . 1. 1 Pressurized Modules. One area where the design of the pressurized modules may eliminate the 
need for testing is in exposure to space fluids. The pressurized modules, as shown by current 
designs for both the space shuttle and space station, will have a much more controlled 
environment, fluid systems are designed to ensure that their fluids do not contact electrical power 
wiring, and exposure inside the modules to launch vehicle fluids are unlikely [23]. Additionally, 
the activity of the crew members, as well as any maintenance procedures, can lead to unacceptable 
mechanical stresses on wiring insulations, accelerating the rate of degradation [23,33,40,49,50]. 
7.1.2 LEO/GEO. When considering the meteoroid and debris, atomic oxygen, and radiation 
environment, system design must take into account the probability and criticality of a failure, and 
then shield the insulation, or provide redundancy, to bring the hazard down to an acceptable level. 
Many current and future satellites are expected to require operations beyond 10 years, all polymeric 
materials will degrade rapidly in such environments, and they must be protected if significant 
lifetime is required [23]. For LEO/GEO satellites, because they are generally autonomous and 
unserviced, improper handling of insulation is only a concern before launch during assembly, test, 
and launch procedures [23,33,40,49,50]. According to existing NASA recommendations, 
electrical cables and wiring must be enclosed in a "faraday cage" for protection from the space 
plasma [18]. 
7 . 1. 3 Trans-atmospheric Yehicles. The operational environment for the trans-atmospheric vehicles 
are in general the same as the LEOjGEO spacecraft, and EL V's have a relatively short mission life. 
However, the space shuttle orbiters can sustain additional mechanical damage because of their 
reusabilty and resultant continuous maintenance procedures. These lead to high levels of personnel 
traffic in areas of limited working space, which in the past have resulted in insulation damage due 
to extreme mechanical stresses [23,33,40,49,50]. This has resulted in redesigns to wiring 
harnesses, rerouting, and additional physical protection for the wiring systems [9]. Any systems 
with similar maintenance requirements should consider the problems associated with the space 
shuttle wiring systems. 
7.1.4 Lunar and Martian Surface Missions. Again, as in the LEOjGEO case, assuming a 
significant lifetime is required, the system must be designed to alleviate the damage as a result of 
meteoroids (Moon only), and radiation. The activity of the crew members, as well as any 
maintenance procedures can lead to unacceptable mechanical stresses on wiring insulations, 
accelerating the rate of degradation [23,33,40,49,50]. 
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7.2 Comparison of NASA Requirements to Existin& Testin& Data 
Many of the conditions outlined in Section 6 have been addressed previously in DOD and NASA testing 
programs. In most cases, repetition of testing is not required or desired. This section will discuss the 
areas where additional testing is not needed due to the existing database of testing infonnation. 
7.2.1 Existin& Testin& for Aircraft Enyironment The testing which has been perfonned for the 
military aircraft in the DOD programs, as detailed in Section 9, also addresses many of the NASA 
requirements for the testing of wiring insulations. These programs are sufficient to address the 
NASA requirements in the following areas: 
General Properties: This includes analysis of the wire thickness, workmanship, diameter, 
and weight when compared to the wire specifications. 
Electrical Properties: Including the requirements for corona inception and extinction, 
impulse testing, insulation resistance, and dielectric strength under aircraft environmental 
conditions (i.e. non-vacuwn). 
Mechanical Properties: Many mechanical tests have been performed to verify the insulations 
resistance to abrasion, cut through, repeated flexing, notching, cold flow, wire to wire 
abrasion, and crushing. The wires stiffness was also taken into account 
Environmental Properties: The resistance to hydrolysis as a result of exposure to humidity 
(KSC salt fog environment), water, or alkaline cleaners meet the requirements of a NASA 
system, since in general, the most severe humidity environment will be while on earth either 
during storage or transport [13,23,53]. 
Certain space environments are also addressed by standard militarY wire ratings. For example, 
wiring is rated for 100,000 hours at the maximwn operating temperature, based on the rate that 
insulations age when exposed to high temperatures. In general, space wiring systems will not be 
exposed to temperatures higher than the wire rating [23]. However, additional testing may be 
required to address the effects of thermal cycling. 
7.2.2 Existin& Testin& for NASA Enyironments. Other ongoing programs, such as the Space \ 
Shuttle and Space Station programs, have performed testing which addresses many of the unique 
NASA operational environments. These include enriched oxygen (30%) and vacuum 
environmental testing. The testing relevant to this program is summarized in Section 9. This 
testing will be leveraged whenever possible, and repeated tests will not be performed. In many 
cases, since the insulations being considered are hybrid constructions, testing may have been 
previously performed on wire constructions using the same materials present in these 
constructions. Therefore, the general behavior may be known, however, certain tests may be 
necessary to determine the comparative capabilities of each specific wire type. 
7.3 Additional NASA Testin& Reguirements. 
By considering the NASA environments, the spacecraft design and operational factors, and the existing 
database of testing, the additional testing required for NASA are determined. The tests to be performed, 
the NASA missions which they address, the test conditions/parameters, test method, and rationale for 
testing are given in Table 4. Table 5 outlines the matrix of testing which has been identified, indicating 
where the NASA operational environments have been satisfied by previous testing, and where additional 
testing is necessary. 
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Table 4. Add'" I NASA Tesf 
---------
. tID!! R ts 
Test Property Environment NASA Missions Test Method Test Conditions Rationale for Testing/Discussion Addressed 
Air PM,LG, TA,L,M 28 -1:!OVDC Testing at NASA voltage levels. 
Vacuum LG,TA,L,M NHB 8060.lC #18 Ambient Conditions Earth suttace operation, assembly, and test. Arc 10-2 g NASA microgravity environment. 
Tracking Enriched Oxygen PM MlL-STD-2223 5 x 10-5 Torr NASA vacuum environment. 
Reduced Gravity PM,LG, TA,L,M 30%02 NASA high oxygen environment. 
Insulation Resistance Multistress PM, LG, TA, L, M ASTMD-3032 400 Hz, 2OO'C, 500 Hrs Analysis of new insulation constructions. 
Dielectric Strength Multistress PM, LG, TA, L, M ASTMD·149 400Hz&DC@23'C, Analysis of new insulation constructions. l00'C & 2OO'C 
Corona Aircraft PM SAEAS-4373 400 Hz & DC, 5 x l(}S, Complete analysis of new wire construction for 
Inception/Extinction Vacuum LG,TA,L,M Method 502 49, & 758 Torr aircraft applications. Analyze all samples in vacuum. 
Wire Fusing Time Aircraft PM, LG, TA, L, M :SAJ:!A:S-43"!3 2.5 times rated current Analysis of new insulation constructions. Method 511 
Time/Current to Smoke Aircraft PM, LG, TA, L, M :SAl:! A:S-4313 10 A + 5 A/30 s intervals Analysis of new insulation constructions. Method 5(J7 
Abrasion Resistance Aircraft PM,LG, TA,L,M :SAE A:S-43"13 1 - 3 Ibs, 60 Hz @ 25 & 150'C Analysis of new insulation constructions. Method 701 
-..,J 
Dynamic Cut Through Aircraft PM, LG, TA, L, M 
SAEA:S-4J"!3 23'C, 70'C, 150'C, 200'C Analysis of new insulation constructions. Method 703 
Flex Life Aircraft PM, LG, TA, L, M SAE AS-4373 180' bend @ 30 cycles/min. Analysis of new insulation constructions. Method 704 w 
Thermal Cycling Temperature Range, LG,TA,L,M To Be Determined To Be Determined Number of thermal cycles, and extreme cold warrants tests. Extreme Temperatures 
Flammability Enriched Oxygen PM NHB 8060.1C #1 & #4 30% O2, (200'C #4 only) Comparison of hybrid samples and new construction. 
Offgassing/Odoring Crewed Cabin PM NHB 8060.1 C #6 & #7 25.9% O2, 50'C Comparison of hybrid samples and new construction. 
Fluid Compatibility Space Fluids LG, TA,L,M NHB 8060.1C#lS N20 4, N2H4, N;zH3CH3 Comparison of hybrid samples and new construction. 
Gas Compatibility Martian Atmosphere M To Be Determined 95.3% CO2 Mission specific, far term application,low priority. 
Outgassing (VCM) Vacuum LG,TA,L,M ASTME-595 5 x 10-5 Torr, 125'C, 24 Hrs Comparison of hybrid samples and new construction. 
Electromagnetic Limited Atmosphere LG, TA,L,M MSFCMethod 10,000 ESH, 110 - ZOO nm, Analysis of earth orbit environment. Radiation 120'C 
Particulate Radiation Limited Atmosphere LG,TA,L To Be Determined To Be Determined Mission specific,low priority. 
Atomic Oxygen Space Environment LG,TA MSFCMethod 1023 atoms/cm2' 0.01 eV Analysis of earth orbit environment. 
AtomIC Oxygen/EM Synergistic Environment PM, LG, TA, L, M MSFCMethod Above VUV and AO levels Analysis of earth orbit environment. Radiation 
Corona Discharge Charged Plasma LG,TA,M To Be Determined To Be Determined Analysis of earth orbit environment. 
Debris Impact Meteoroids/Plasma LG,TA,L To Be Determined To Be Determined Analysis of earth orbit environment. 
Electrostatic Dust Lunar Regolith L To Be Determined To Be Determined Mission specific, far term application,low priority. 
l __ _ Key: PM = Pressurized Modules, LG = LEO/GEO, TA= Trans-atmospheric Vehicles, L = Lunar Suttace, M = Martian Surface 
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Section 8. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of Task #1 of the NASA Wiring for Space Applications Program were shown in this report. 
This task presents the operational environments for the electrical power wiring of NASA space vehicles, 
and outlines the additional testing required, beyond the testing performed previously by the DOD and 
NASA, for use of the insulation constructions in NASA spacecraft. The required tests will be performed 
as a part of Task #2 of this program. Also, as shown in this report, there are operational considerations 
such as maintenance procedures which can contribute to degradation of wiring systems. These wiring 
system issues will be addressed in Task #3 of the program. The results of the testing and analysis phase 
(Task #2) and the power wiring system analysis phase (Task #3) will be reported as they become 
available. 
Through this program, in conjunction with the efforts of other US governmentaIlaboratories, industry, 
and academia, a better understanding of arc tracking in wiring insulations will be achieved. In addition, 
the top performing "hybrid" insulation constructions, such as those being addressed in this program are 
expected to go through military qualification in the near future. It is anticipated that the efforts of the 
NASA wiring program will be closely coordinated with the military efforts, such that the NASA and 
military standards will be in agreement The resulting database of information will help in the development 
of lightweight, safe, and reliable wiring systems applying new wiring constructions which are resistant to 
arc tracking, and suitable for use in aerospace applications. 
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SECTION 9. APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF EXISTING TEST DATA 
This program is leveraging the large quantities of valuable testing data gathered previously by DOD and 
NASA programs. The related program reports and databases which were identified and used to develop a 
database of existing testing information are given in references 11 - 13,26,53, and 56 - 59. 1hls section 
will give a description of the wiring insulation types which are used in these testing programs, and a 
summary of the testing results from these programs to date. 
9.1 Candidate Wirina: Constructions 
Table 6 describes the wire types which have been included in the existing testing for aerospace and space 
applications. 
Table 6. Description of Insulation Constructions [53] 
Insulation Sample Description Comments Construction 
1 MIL-W-81381/7 6 mil wall polyimide insulation, silver coated copper. Control wire, restricted use by military and NASA due to arc tracking.[I2,I5]. 
2 MIL-W-81381/l1 8.6 mil wall polyimide insulation, silver coated copper. Control wire, restricted use by military and NASA due to arc tracking.[12,15]. 
3 MIL-W-22759/l2 P'IFE or TFE insulated wire, nickel coated copper. High temperature insulation currently in use on spacecraft. 
4 MIL-W-22759/l6 ETFE insulated wire, tin coated copper, medium weight Poor flammability pcrfOllIWlce in enriched ox ygen environment [57]. 
5 MIL-W-22759/l8 ETFE insulated wire, tin coated copper, light weight Poor flammability perfOllIWlce in enriched oxygen environment [57]. 
6 MIL-W-22759f32 XL-E1'FE insulated wire, tin coated copper. Poor flammability perfolIlla';'ce in enriched oxygen environment [57]. 
7 MIL-W-22759f34 XL-ETFE insulated wire, tin coated copper, Poor flammability perfOllIWlce in enriched oxygen environment [57]. polyamide braid cover. 
8 MIL-W-22759/43 XL-ETFE insulated wire, silver coated copper, Control wire for airCIaft testing performed by Air Force [53]. 
normal weight 
9 MIL-W-16878 TFE insulated wire, silver coated copper, Type EE. Not in NASA approved parts list (MIL-S1D-975). 
10 SSQ-21652 Silicone insulated wire, nickel coated copper. Insulation tesIed and approved for Space Station Program [26]. 
11 SSQ-21656 TFE insulated wire, nickel coated copper Insulation tested and approved for Space Station Program [26]. (also NG1W-'IFFrxx). 
12 MP571-OO86 Polyimide insulated wire, nickel coated copper. Polyimide control wire, 
13 Filotcx - TKT P'IFE Extrusion/616 Kapton (50% Min OL)I One of top ''hybrid'' insulations from the Air Force program [53]. P1FE Dispemon 
14 Tensolite - TKT 200AJ919 (50% Min OL)/PTFE Tape (50% Min OL) One of top ''hybrid'' insulations from the Air Force program [53]. 
15 Tbermatics - TKT Modified P'IFE Tape (50% OL)fl'PT Tape (50% OL)I One of top ' 'hybrid'' insulations from the Air Force program [53]. Mod P'IFE Tape (50% OL)/PTFE Disp=ion 
16 GoreHS-725 P'IFE (50% OL)/HSCR P1FE (50% OL) Considered promising in the Air Force program oo.t dropped due to single 
source prohibition, characterization to be continued in NASA program [53]. 
17 Nema#3-TKT 616 Kapton (45-50% OL)lExtruded XL ETFE One of top ''hybrid'' insulations from the Air Force program , but not 
available for additional testing [53]. 
18 Ban:e1-TKT 2919 Kapton (50% OL)/Unsintered PTFE Tape. Buttwrap E1iminated from further testing after the Air Force program [53]. 
19 Nema#2-TKT P'IFE TapeI616 Kapton (50% OL)IPTFE Tape E1iminatcd from further testing after the Air Force program [53]. 
20 DuPont (P-FP) New P-FP Tape (50% OL)/New P-FP Tape E1iminatcd from further testing after the Air Force program [53]. (50%OL)IFP 
21 Brand Rex - TKT XL ETFE Tape (50% OL)/Kapton (50% OL) E1iminated from further testing after the Air Force program [53]. /XL ETFE Tape (50% OL) 
22 Ownp1ain -ncr 2919 Kapton (50% OL)/Extruded XL ETFE Eliminated from further testing after the Air Force program [53J. 
23 TRW-PFPI TRW - PFPI New insulation material to be tcsted further in the NASA program. 
Abbreviations: 2919Kapton = 0.5 mil FluorocaIbon (PTFE), 1 mil Polyimide, 0.5 mil FluorocaIbon (PTFE) 
616Kapton = 0.1 mil Fluorocalixln (FEP), 1 mil Polyimide, 0.1 mil Fluorocarixln (FEP) 
2OOAJ919 = 0.5 mil Fluorocarbon (P'IFE), 1 mil Polyimide, 0.5 mil FluorocaIbon (PTFE) 
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9.2 Department of Defense Wire Testin2" Pro2"rams 
This section gives a sununary of the data which has been gathered for wire insulation testing by DOD 
programs which are also applicable to the objectives of the NASA Electrical Power Wiring Program. 
These include the programs of the Air Force Wright Laboratory and the Naval Research Laboratory. 
The Air Force WL program evaluated new insulation constructions for aerospace wiring applications. The 
results from this work are summarized in Tables 7 - 10, where the sample numbers are as defined in 
Table 7. WL Aerospace Wiring Test Results - General Properties [53]. 
Test Title Test Method Test Conditions! Samples Conclusion/Comments Parameters 
Finished Weight SAEAS-4372 1000 hrs, 200'C 1,2, 8, 13-15, 17 Filotex, Thermatics, Tensolite and 
thermal aging MIL-W-22759 performed best 
Finished Diameter SAEAS-4372 Unconditiooed wire 1,2,8, 13-15, 17 Filotex and Thermatics performed best 
Conductor Diameter ASTM D-3032 Unconditiooed wire 1,2,8,13-22 All samples comparable. 
Wire Wall Thickness SAE AS-4373 Unconditiooed wire 1,2,8,13-22 All samples comparable. Method 401 
Workmanship SAEAS-4373 Unconditiooed wire 1,2, 8, 13-15, 17 All samples comparable. Method 901 
Examine Product SAEAS-4373 Unconditiooed wire 1,2,8, 13-15, 17 Filotex, MIL-W-22759 and MlL-W -81381 Method 902 weighed least, Tensolite was heaviest. 
Wire SUIface SAEAS-4373 Unconditiooed wire 1,2,8,13-22 M22759 best, M81381 worst Markability Method 713 
Table 8 WL Aerospace Wiring Test Results - Mechanical Properties [53] . . 
Test Title Test Method Test Conditions! Samples Conclusion/Comments Parameters 
SAE AS-4373 1 - 3 lbs, 60 Hz @ 25 & 150' C 1,2,8,13-22 Filotex, Tensolite, Thermatics good, Gore Abrasion Method 701 Unaged and at 1000 hrs/200' C sample did not perform well. 
Dynamic Cut SAEAS-4373 23'C,70'C, 150' C,2OO'C 1,2,8,13-22 Kapton performed best, Tensolite and Through Method 703 Unaged and at 1000 hrs/2oo'C Thermatics were next best performers. 
Flex Life SAEAS-4373 180' bend @ 30 cycleslmin 1,2,8,13-22 Kapton & Gore best samples, all other Method 704 Unaged and at 1000 hrs/200' C samples similar in performance. 
Notch Propagatioo 
SAEAS-4373 50 & 67% notch depth Unaged 1,2,8,13-22 Filotex, Tensolite, Thermatics, and Method 707 and at 1000 hrs/200'C MIL-W-81381 performed equally well 
Stiffness and SAEAS-4373 Uncooditioned samples 1,2,8,13-22 MIL-W-81381 is stiffest, all other samples 
Springback Method 708 comparable in their perlormance. 
Crush Resistance 
ASTMD-3032 
Uncooditioned samples 1,2,8, 13-15, 17 MIL-W-81381 is best, all other samples Section 20 comparable in their perlormance. 
Insulation Impact ASTMD-256 
0.0625 diameter impact edge 1,2, 8, 13-15, 17 
MIL-W-81381 is best, all other samples 
Resistance Method A comparable in their perlormance. 
Tensile Strength SAEAS-4373 Uncooditioned samples 1, 2, 8,13-15,17 MIL-W-81381, Thermatics and Tensolite are best Method 706 
Wire to WIre Rub MDA Test 48 cycles/min, 870 hrs 1,2, 8,13-15,17 All samples comparable. Method 
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Table 6, and the final statistical wire rankings are given in Table 11. The top three "hybrid" candidate 
constructions when compared to MIL-W-81381 had increased flexibility, had good performance in wet 
and dry arc tracking tests, and had increased temperature capabilities, but they had slightly lower 
mechanical properties [53]. When compared to the MIL-W-22759 (XL-ETFE), they had superior 
mechanical properties in temperatures greater than 70°C and were superior in the flammability and smoke 
generation tests, but had less flexibilty [53]. 
Testing performed by the Naval Research Laboratory on polyimide degradation due to exposure to 
humidity environments and also for susceptibility to arc tracking are reported in references 11 - 13. and are 
outlined in Table 12. Again, the samples are as described in Table 6. 
Table 9. WL Aerospace Wiring Test Results - Electrical Properties [53]. 
Test Title Test Method Test Conditions! Samples Conclusion/Comments Parameters 
SAEAS-4373 8 kV, unconditioned wire 1,2, 8, 13-15, 17 Filotex, Tensolite, Gore, MIL-W-81381 and Impulse Dielectric Method 503 MIL-W-227S9 are all comparable. 
Insulation Resistance SAE AS-4373 Thermal aging (1000 hrsf200'C) 1,2,8,13-22 All samples comparable. Method 504 
Sparlc Test SAEAS-4373 15 kV, unconditioned wire 1, 2, 8, 13-15, 17 All samples comparable. Method 503 
Dry Dielectric Test SAE AS-4373 25 kV, unconditioned wire 1, 2, 8,13-15, 17 All samples comparable. Method 503 
Voltage Withstand SAEAS-4373 Thermal aging (1000 hrsf200'C) 1,2,8,13-22 All samples comparable. Method 510 2.SkV, 60Hz@SOOV/s 
Dielectric Constant SAEAS-4373 Unconditioned wire 1, 2, 8, 13-15, 17 Tensolite, MIL-W-227S9, and Filotex best Method 501 
samples. 
CIV/CEV SAEAS-4373 
400 Hz & DC, 49 & 758 Torr 1,2, 8, 13-15, 17 Tensolite best, Thermatics worst. (AC & DC) Method 502 
Surface Resistance SAEAS-4373 96 hrs19S% RH/2S' C 1, 2,8,13-15, 17 All samples comparable. Method 506 
Time/Current to SAEAS-4373 10A+SA!30 s 1,2,8, 13-15,17 All samples comparable. 
Smoke Method 507 
Wire Fusing Time SAEAS-4373 2.5 times free air rated current 1,2,8, 13-15,17 Tensolite and MIL-W-81381 performed best. Method 511 (AWG#22 -~t= 4S A) 
Dry Arc Resistance SAEAS-4373 28VDC 1,2,8,13-22 Bundled wires, Kapton showed propagation, most Method 301 other samples didn't, most failed voltage test. 
BSIDry Arc BSI90n6828 28 VDC, 115 V/400 Hz 1, 2, 8, 13-15, 17 Bundled wires, Thermatics, Tensolite, and 
Resistance BSI9O/80606 Filotex best wire sample types. 
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Table 10. WL Aerospace Wiring Test Results - Environmental Properties [53]. 
Test Title Test Method Test Conditions! Samples Conclusion/Comments Parameters 
Aging Stability 
SAEAS-4373 
Method 510 230·C for 96 hrs 1,2,8,13-15, 17 All samples comparable. 
Thermal Index SAEAS-4373 220 - 280·C aging to bend failllR 1,2,8,13-15, 17 Filotex, Tensolite, Thermatics and Method 804 MlL-W-81381 are compar3ble. 
Thermal Shock SAEAS-4373 
-SS·C to 200·C, 4/30 min cycles 1,2,8, 13-15, 17 Filotex, Tensolite, MlL-W-22759 and Method 80S MlL-W-81381 are comparable. 
Thermal Aging SAEAS-4373 1000 hrs at 2OD·C 1,2,8, 13-15, 17 Thermatics, Filotex, Tensolite and Method 807 MlL-W-22759 were similar. 
Cold Bend SAEAS-4373 ~5·C for 4 hrs, 2 !pill wraping 1,2,8, 13-lS, 17 Filotex and Tensolite were best samples. Method 702 
F1ammability SAEAS-4373 1,2,8,13-22 MlL-W-81381, Tensolite and Filotex Method 801 Amhientair are comparable. 
Toxicity - Burning Naval Engineering 1 to 2 gram bum mass 1,2,8,13-22 Filotex, Thermatics, and MIL-W -22759 Standard 713 are comparable. 
Smoke Quantity SAEAS-4373 Radiant heat and flame exposure 1,2, 8, 13-lS, 17 All other samples performed similarly Method 803 better than MIL-W-227S9. 
Wet An; Tracking SAEAS-4373 Unconditiooed wire 1,2,8,13-15, 17 Filotex, Tensolite and Thermatics all comparable. MethodS09 
Fluid Immersion SAEAS-4373 Aerospace fluids 1,2,8,13-22 All samples are comparable. Method 603 
Forced Hydrolysis SAEAS-4373 5% salt water, 70·C, 720 hrs; 1,2,8, 13-15, 17 Tensolite and MIL-W-227S9 were the Method 602 Unaged and at 1000 hrs!200·C best perfOimers. 
Humidity SAEAS-4373 70"C, 95% RH, 360 hrs 1,2,8,13-15,17 MlL-W-22759 was best. Filotex and 
Resistance Method 603 Tensolite next best. 
Wicking SAEAS-4373 Dye solution 1,2,8, 13-lS, 17 All samples comparable. Method 607 
Weight Loss SAEAS-4373 36 Torr, 2OQ·C, 384 hrs 1,2, 8,13-lS, 17 Tensolite performed best. Method 604 
Weathering SAEAS-4373 120/8 hr UV cycles, 40 - 70·C 1,2,8, 13-lS, 17 All insulatioos comparable. 
Resistance Method 606 
Table 11. WL Aerospace Wiring Test Program Final Statistical Test Results [53]. 
Wire Rank Screen Test Screen Test Full Performance Full Performance 
Unweighted Aircraft Weighted Unweighted Aircraft Weighted 
1 Filotex Filotex Tensolite Filotex 
2 Thermatics Thermatics Filotex Tensolite 
3 Gore* NEMA#3 MIL-W-81381 MIL-W-81381 
4 NEMA#3 Gore* Thermatics Thermatics 
5 MIL-W-81381 MIL-W-81381 NEMA#3 NEMA#3 
6 Tensolite Tensolite MIL-W-22759 MIL-W-22759 
7 Barcel Champlain -- --
8 Champlain Bareel -- --
9 MIL-W-22759 NEMA#2 -- --
10 NEMA#2 MIL-W-22759 -- -
11 DuPont Brand Rex -- --
12 Brand Rex DuPont - --
* The Gore constructIOn was elimmated after screenmg tests due to Air Force sole source restncnons. 
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Table 12. NRL Aerospace Wiring Test Results [11-13]. 
Test Title Test Method Test Conditions! Samples Conclusion/Comments Parameters 
Wet Arc Tracking AS1MD-2303 1 % salt water solution 2,4,7 The polyimide insulation exhibited arc tracking 
and flashover [12]. 
Hydrolysis AS1MD-3032 6O'C to 9O'C, 70% - 100% RH 2 Humidity accelerates polyimide degradation [11,13]. 
9.3 NASA Wire Testjna: Proa:rams 
Testing has been performed in other NASA programs which are applicable to this program. Two specific 
programs, one which addresses arc tracking for the Space Station Freedom program and another which 
considers the flammability of ETFE and XL-ETFE constructions in enriched oxygen environments, are 
discussed in references 26 and 57 and summarized in Table 13, with the samples as given in Table 6. 
Table 13. NASA Wiring Test Results [26,57). 
Test Title Test Method Test Conditions! Samples Conclusion/Comments Parameters 
Arc Tracking 
JSC Test Method 
4,7,9 - 12, 15,16 The SSQ-21656, SSQ-21652 and MIL-W-TPS# 8PL9120004 28 -120 VDC, 117 VAC 22759{34 did not arc track [26]. 
Electrical Wire NHB 8060.1C 
> 25% ~ concentration 4-7 Use of these insulations are not a safe choice for Flammability TestM these enriched oxygen envirronments [57]. 
The NASA MSFC Materials and Processes Laboratory Technical Information System - MAPTIS [56] 
contains the data from testing performed according to the NASA test specifications for "Flammability, 
Odor, Offgassing, and Compatibility Requirements and Test Procedures for Materials in Environments 
that Support Combustion," NHB 8060.1C. This database contains information on many tests, those 
which are directly related to this program are summarized in Table 14. Again the samples are as described 
in Table 6, with the exception of sample A, which is an unspecified MIL-W-81381 construction (i.e. no 
/xx definition), and B is an unspecified MIL-W-22759 construction. 
9.4 Summary of Tests Performed ys. Wirina: Constructions ) 
Table 15 presents for the wiring constructions described in Table 6, a summary of the testing status for the [ 
numerous tests identified as important for NASA wiring systems. The table outlines the tests which 
already have been performed, those to be performed in this program. those not necessary, and those which 
are a low priority for tests which are not scheduled to be tested at this time, but may have research value. 
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Table 14. NASA MAPTIS Test Data [56]. 
I 
I 
~ 
I 
I 
I 
Test Title 
Upward Flame 
Propagation 
Flash Point of 
Liquids 
Electrical Wire 
Flammability 
Odor Assessment 
Offgassed 
Products 
Mechanical Impact 
for Materials in 
LOXandGOX 
Outgassing in 
Vacuum 
~---
Test Method 
NHB8060.IC 
Test #1 
NHB8060.IC 
Test #3 
NHB8060.IC 
Test#4A 
NHB8060.1C 
Test#4B 
NHBS06O.IC 
Test #6 
NHB8060.IC 
Test #7 
NHB8060.1C 
Test #13 
ASTME-
595-90 
Test Conditions! 
Parameters 
20.9% ~, 14.7 psi 
25.9% 00 14.3 psi 
30.3%~, 9.3 psi 
30.3% ~, 20.4 psi 
100% Oz, 14.7 psi 
24%~, 14.5 psi 
25.9%~, 14.3 psi 
30%~, 10 psi 
20.9% ~, 14.7 psi 
25.9%~, 14.3 psi 
30%~, 10.2 psi 
20.9% 00 14.7 psi 
25.9% 00 14.3 psi 
30%~, 10 psi 
100% ~, 30 psi 
26% O2, 12.3 psi, 120°F, 72 hrs 
20.9%~, 14.5 psi, 1200F, 72 hrs 
100% GOX, 50 psi. 480°F 
100% GOX, 14.7 psi, 75°F 
100% LOX, 14.7 psi, -297°F 
5xl<r5 torr, 125°C, 24 hrs 
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Samples Conclusion/Comments 
5,6 
2 Various sample types have passed the 
2 30% ~ environment. Others have not 
A,B passed or not tested. 
A,B 
A 
This test for information only, no future tests A,B 
5 planned in this area. 
5 
4 
11 Various sample types have passed the 
30% ~ environment. Others have not 
5,6 
2,3 
passed or not tested. 
A,B,12 
A,B 
A Polyimide sample passed test. 
2,3,6 Polyimide, P1FE, and XL-ETFE samples passed test. 
2,11,16 
A,B Various samples have passed test. 
A,B 
2,11 Polyimide and silicone rubber samples have 
passed the test. 
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